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Abstract 
 
Because Hayek’s view goes beyond the Walrasian framework, his descriptive arguments on 
socialist planned economies are prone to be misunderstood. This paper clarifies Hayek’s 
arguments by using them as a basis to construct a model of total factor productivity. The model 
shows that productivity depends substantially on the intelligence of ordinary workers. The 
model indicates that the essential reason for the reduced productivity of a socialist economy is 
that, even though human beings are imperfect and do not know everything about the universe, 
they are able to utilize their intelligence to innovate. Decentralized market economies are far 
more productive than socialist economies because they intrinsically can fully utilize human 
beings’ intelligence, but socialist planned economies cannot, in large part because of the 
imagined perfect central planning bureau that does not exist.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Most socialist planned economies (SPEs) collapsed or changed dramatically to largely 
decentralized economies in the late twentieth century. This fact clearly indicates that SPEs are 
far less productive and grow far more slowly than decentralized market economies (DMEs). In 
fact, the inferiority of the performance of SPEs as compared to DMEs has been so obvious that 
debate on the superiority between the two has almost disappeared in the twenty-first century. 
However, the reasons for the failure of SPEs have not been fully understood theoretically.  
Debate over the two systems has a long history. The most well-known and important 
debate was the intense “socialist calculation” debate that took place during the interwar period 
in the 1920s and 1930s. Mises (1920) first asserted that SPEs are intrinsically unable to be as 
efficient as DMEs. Lange (1936, 1937, 1938) and Lerner (1944) responded to this assertion by 
showing an SPE model that is a mimic of a DME and is as efficient. Lange’s model is strictly 
based on the equilibrium economics of Walras and appears perfectly correct from the Walrasian 
point of view. Therefore, many economists at the time considered Lange’s model as the final 
answer to the question. However, Hayek (1937, 1945, 2002) countered that properly dealing 
with widely dispersed and privately owned information in an economy is the main difficulty in 
economic calculations and Lange’s model does not mimic this important feature. Hayek argued 
that, in DMEs, entrepreneurs play important roles in fully utilizing widely dispersed and 
privately owned information. In contrast, in SPEs such a mechanism does not work because 
there is no incentive to do so and a central planning bureau (CPB) cannot substitute for 
entrepreneurs. Lange counter-argued that such an incentive is not necessary because it can be 
replaced with a rule. In Lange’s model, a CPB need not necessarily determine everything. 
Instead, managers in dispersed plants are required to adjust the marginal cost in each plant 
according to a surplus or shortage by a predetermined simple rule. 
 If we limit our point of view to analyses within the Walrasian framework, the 
Lange-Lerner solution was considered to be a perfect answer; thus, before the 1970s, many 
mainstream economists accepted the defeat of Mises and Hayek in the socialist calculation 
debate as conventional wisdom (e.g., Lavoie, 1981). Stiglitz (1994) argued that, if the 
neoclassical model of economy were correct, the market socialism Lange showed would have 
been correct. Hayek’s counter-arguments were viewed as focusing on trivial matters. For Lange, 
equilibrium in the Walrasian framework was the end goal, and he may have never understood 
the challenge posed by Mises and Hayek (Lavoie, 1981). However, the seriously malfunctioning 
economies of the USSR and other socialist countries increased people’s awareness of the 
importance of Hayek’s arguments. Many economists began to accept the possibility that all 
important aspects of an economy cannot be described only within the Walrasian framework. 
Therefore, even though Lange’s SPE model may appear to show that SPEs can work as 
efficiently as DMEs from the Walrasian point of view, they may not actually work as well 
unless they can also mimic other important aspects of DMEs.  
 Currently, Hayek is widely viewed as the winner of the socialist calculation debate. 
However, this judgment seems to have been made mostly on the basis of historical 
fact—socialist states, such as the USSR, actually collapsed. Hayek, as a prominent opponent of 
SPEs, is admired mainly in reaction to this fact, but the admiration does not necessarily indicate 
that Hayek’s arguments are fully understood and accepted theoretically. If anything, Hayek’s 
arguments are prone to be misunderstood for two primary reasons: (1) they go beyond the 
Walrasian framework and (2) his papers are descriptive and do not use mathematical models 
and are thus viewed as ambiguous by many readers. The purpose of this paper is to make 
Hayek’s arguments more straightforward by using them as a basis to construct a model of total 
factor productivity (TFP). With the model, we can quantitatively follow Hayek’s ideas and 
thereby substantially reduce ambiguity, resulting in a clearer explanation of the collapse of 
SPEs.  
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 The model is strongly based on Hayek’s view of knowledge. He stressed that tacit and 
dispersed knowledge that is discovered during market processes is an essential element of 
DMEs. The knowledge is important because human beings are imperfect and cannot know 
everything about the universe. Because of human imperfections, many unexpected problems 
occur continuously during economic activities, and these occurrences are only locally known. 
Human beings are bestowed with intelligence, which they can use to generate innovations to fix 
unexpected problems. Hayek’s view of knowledge includes all aspects of this widely dispersed 
information.  
 In particular, the model focuses on innovations generated locally by ordinary (average) 
workers. Innovations are usually presumed to be created by researchers and other highly 
educated or trained employees, and this bounded nature of innovation has been explicitly or 
implicitly assumed in most economic analyses. However, conceptually, innovations are not 
necessarily created only by researchers and similarly highly trained employees. At its core, 
innovation is the act of introducing something new or it is something that has been newly 
introduced; the concept does not exclude things or processes created by ordinary workers. The 
question is whether workers who are not well educated or highly trained can innovate, that is, 
create something new. The answer to that question is yes, even if most of the innovations are 
minor, because workers are human, possess intelligence, and therefore have the ability to create.  
 The model shows that the economy’s overall productivity depends substantially on 
ordinary worker’s innovations, i.e., their intelligence. Without innovations, productivity remains 
very low. In a DME, workers’ innovations are fully utilized because they benefit both 
entrepreneurs and workers, and thereby entrepreneurs fully exploit the opportunity that workers’ 
innovations provide. On the other hand, in an SPE, productivity remains at far lower levels than 
those found in a DME because the CPB cannot sufficiently obtain and process information on 
the intellectual activities of tens of millions of workers and managers. A pure SPE is therefore 
intrinsically far less productive than a DME.  
 My paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, Hayek’s view of knowledge is 
summarized and a model is constructed on the basis of that view in Section 3. The productivity 
of SPEs and DMEs is compared using the model in Section 4. Scientific innovations in SPEs are 
specifically examined in Section 5, and some related topics, such as China’s socialist market 
economy, are discussed in Section 6. Finally, I offer concluding remarks in Section 7. 
 
2  HAYEK’S VIEW OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
Although knowledge is often regarded specifically as scientific knowledge, Hayek emphasized 
knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place. This type of knowledge is 
important because economic environments and conditions constantly change. Hayek argued that 
the nature of “changing every moment” is at the core of DME.  
 
[T]oday it is almost heresy to suggest that scientific knowledge is not the sum of all 
knowledge. But a little reflection will show that there is beyond question a body of 
very important but unorganized knowledge which cannot possibly be called scientific 
in the sense of knowledge of general rules: the knowledge of the particular 
circumstances of time and place. It is with respect to this that practically every 
individual has some advantage over all others in that he possesses unique information 
of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be made only if the 
decisions depending on it are left to him or are made with his active cooperation. 
(Hayek, 1945) 
 
 Hayek went on to add, “[T]he knowledge of which I am speaking consists to a great 
extent of the ability to detect certain conditions—an ability that individuals can use effectively 
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only when the market tells them what kinds of goods and services are demanded, and how 
urgently” (Hayek, 2002). For Hayek, the role of markets and prices is not only the allocation of 
resources but also the discovery of knowledge under constantly changing circumstances. 
Dispersed tacit knowledge about particular circumstances possessed by a person at a particular 
point in time and space is discovered during the market process by entrepreneurs who are 
seeking profit opportunities. Although the concept of equilibrium presupposes that the relevant 
facts have been discovered and that the process of competition has thus come to an end, 
competition actually does not end at any moment in an always changing economy because 
competition is systematically a procedure for discovering facts.  
 Note that this concept of knowledge is different from that of private information used 
in the economics of information. An important feature of knowledge from Hayek’s point of 
view is that it can be tacit (Hayek, 1967), and a person may unconsciously possess knowledge 
but may become aware of the knowledge during the market process. Even though a person does 
not know ex ante the knowledge as given information, the knowledge may become known 
publicly through the market mechanism ex post. On the other hand, private information is given 
to a person ex ante and is not known to the others even ex post. Contract theory generally 
assumes that information is given in advance and the principal and the agent make a contract 
considering given information, whereas Hayek considered the phenomena of change and 
discovery during the market process. That is, the economics of information is still situated 
within the Walrasian framework, but Hayek’s arguments go beyond it so the contractual 
problems that the economics of information and contract theory deal with are basically 
irrelevant in this context.  
 The importance of the knowledge originates in the imperfect nature of human beings. 
As a result, many unexpected problems occur during daily economic activities in widely 
dispersed locations. Such unexpected problems substantially hinder economic activities, but 
human beings are not completely powerless to address these problems because they are 
bestowed with intelligence. With intelligence, human beings can fix unexpected problems 
through innovation. Notice that the knowledge of unexpected problems and the corresponding 
innovations are inevitably unknown ex ante.  
Hayek argued that economists who consent to Lange’s model ignore the imperfections 
in knowledge and in the dispersal of information: “[T]he knowledge of the circumstances of 
which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the 
dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate 
individuals possess” (Hayek, 1945). From Hayek’s point of view, the market is a disequilibrium 
non-Paretian process that is completely different from the one depicted in the Walrasian 
framework, which focuses on equilibrium with static information. For Hayek, the disequilibria 
that originate in dispersed new discoveries are one of the most important elements that make the 
market indispensable. These disequilibria indicate new opportunities for profit-seeking 
entrepreneurs, through which the economy is vitalized. Hayek called this market process 
“spontaneous order.”  
 As a consequence of his deliberation on the process of spontaneous order, Hayek 
concluded that knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place possessed by the 
“man on the spot” can only be utilized in decentralized markets and that markets are superior to 
socialist planning not because they can achieve more efficient resource allocation in the 
Walrasian sense but because they better discover and utilize dispersed personal knowledge.  
 
3  WORKERS’ INNOVATIONS 
 
To better understand Hayek’s arguments on knowledge, I first examined the mechanism of 
knowledge generation. To begin with, I examined how an unexpected problem is fixed through 
workers’ innovations at dispersed production sites. Here, I use Harashima’s (2009) TFP model 
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that well describes the mechanism of innovation generation at dispersed production sites. 
 
3.1  Innovations generated by ordinary workers 
3.1.1  Non-accumulative innovation 
3.1.1.1  Innovations need not be intrinsically accumulative  
Innovations are usually considered to be intrinsically accumulative, and TFP reflects the total 
sum of innovations that have been created and accumulated in the long history of human beings. 
However, accumulativeness is not a necessary condition for innovation because, as discussed in 
the introduction, its core meaning is the act of introducing something new or the thing itself that 
has been newly introduced. Luecke and Katz (2003) argue that innovation is generally 
understood as the introduction of a new thing or method and the embodiment, combination, or 
synthesis of knowledge in original, relevant, valued new products, processes, or services. The 
essence of innovation is therefore not accumulativeness but newness.  
 Nevertheless, non-accumulative innovations have drawn little or no attention in 
economics because innovations that are not accumulated have been regarded as being without 
value from an economic point of view. Accumulated innovations are often thought of as 
knowledge or technology, and they are usually regarded as equivalent to TFP. An innovation 
that is not accumulated is not included as knowledge, technology, or TFP because these must be 
commonly accessible and non-accumulative innovations are not. From this perspective, 
non-accumulated innovations are considered to have no effect on production and therefore be 
meaningless. The neglect of non-accumulative innovation may also be partially attributed to the 
belief that innovations must be accumulated because they have the innate nature of spillover 
(i.e., transfer), which implies accumulation. If an innovation makes someone better off, rational 
people have incentive to obtain and utilize it; thus, the innovation spills over. To spill over, the 
innovation must be recorded and transferrable in advance, that is, accumulated as a common 
piece of knowledge or technology. Conversely, innovations must be accumulated if they are 
consistent with the incentives of rational people.  
 However, the above rationales do not necessarily hold, for the following reason. A 
non-accumulative innovation is without value to people who did not create it, and the above 
rationales are convincing if only those people are considered. There is, however, no a priori 
reason that a non-accumulative innovation is valueless to the person who created it because that 
person can utilize it personally for production even if others cannot. Therefore, even if an 
innovation is not accumulated and does not become common knowledge, it still can contribute 
to production. A non-accumulative innovation may even be an important production element for 
the person who created it. In addition, if the costs to acquire an innovation created by other 
persons are higher than its benefits, the innovation will not spill over. Therefore, the concept 
that some innovations do not spill over and are not accumulated is not inconsistent with rational 
people’s incentives for using innovations. Clearly the accumulativeness of innovation is not a 
simple issue and requires more careful consideration.  
 
3.1.1.2  Innovations that are not accumulated 
Innovations will be used personally even if they are not recognized and recorded. In addition, 
some innovations may be deliberately kept personal. Hence, an innovation will not be 
accumulated if nobody is aware of the innovation’s novelty, nobody records or reports the 
innovation, or the person who created the innovation keeps it secret. The above conditions will 
be satisfied in the following situations. An innovation will not be recognized or recorded if the 
innovation is minor or if the innovation can be applied only to an unrepeatable incident. In 
addition, an incentive to keep an innovation secret will be strong if the person who creates the 
innovation cannot gain enough benefits by making it public. Thus an innovation will not be 
recorded if the costs of making the innovation public are higher than its expected benefits.  
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3.1.1.2.1  Minor innovations 
A person who creates an innovation may be unaware of having created it if its contribution to 
improving productivity is minor. The person may also notice the increased productivity but not 
seek to identify the reason for the improvement because such an investigation may seem too 
costly. Finally, even if the mechanism of the innovation is noticed and specified, the person who 
created it may not record it if it is deemed to be minor. It is therefore clearly possible that minor 
innovations are not noticed, identified, or recorded.  
 Even if an innovation is unnoticed or unrecorded, it still can be used for production by 
the person who created it, whether consciously or unconsciously, while the person continues 
doing that job. Unnoticed innovations will vanish when that person quits doing the job. If 
innovations are recognized but unrecorded, it is possible that at least some of them could be 
handed down to other workers. Because these are isolated and “personal” occurrences within a 
small closed group, they would not constitute a piece of accumulated knowledge common to all 
human beings.  
 
3.1.1.2.2  Innovations for unrepeatable incidents 
Even if an innovation is not minor, it will not be recorded if it can be applied only to an 
unrepeatable situation. For example, a negotiation between a seller and a buyer will be basically 
unrepeatable. Similar negotiations may occur, but an identical one will not. There are also 
incidents that occur, for example, only on a specific machine installed at a particular location; 
these incidents are never reproduced at other machines installed at other locations. This type of 
isolated and non-reproducible incident can be interpreted as unrepeatable in a broad sense. In 
addition to these spatially unrepeatable incidents, each machine has unique characteristics even 
if it was designed to be exactly the same as other machines. There will not be sufficient 
incentive to record or widely disseminate an innovation that can be applied only to an 
unrepeatable situation or to a machine with unique characteristics. 
  
3.1.1.2.3  Costs of disseminating and acquiring information 
There will be a strong incentive to keep an innovation secret if the innovation spills over freely 
without compensation to the innovator. However, even if a patent could be taken out to obtain 
appropriate compensation, the incentive to keep the innovation secret will still be strong if the 
cost of dissemination exceeds expected revenues. If an innovation was created for a minor 
incident, benefits gained from the innovation will usually be smaller than the cost of 
dissemination, and the incentive to keep the innovation personal will be strong. The costs for 
making an innovation public can be classified into two types: dissemination costs and 
acquisition costs. Dissemination costs are the costs paid to make an innovation public and to 
disseminate it, for example, patent application fees, advertising costs, marketing costs, and 
similar expenditures. Acquisition costs are the costs paid to acquire and utilize an innovation 
that some other person created, for example, search costs, transportation costs, and training 
costs. Patent royalties are included in acquisition costs only if the market value of the innovation 
exceeds the royalty plus other acquisition costs. Generally, dissemination costs are likely to be 
larger than acquisition costs, excluding patent royalties. 
 Let δ indicate dissemination costs, η indicate acquisition costs, and π indicate the 
market value of an innovation. As argued above, in general ηδ  if πδ  ; therefore 
innovations are categorized into the following three ranges depending on the relative value of π 
compared with those of δ and η (see Figure 1): 
 
  Range I: δηπ   or ηδπ  ; patented accumulative innovations 
  Range II: ηπδ  ; uncompensated spillovers of accumulative innovations 
  Range III: πηδ  ; non-accumulative innovations  
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If the market value of an innovation exceeds its dissemination and acquisition costs, the patent 
of the innovation will be sold and disseminated widely (Range I). If the market value of an 
innovation does not exceed its dissemination costs but exceeds its acquisition costs, the 
innovation will disseminate widely without compensation (i.e., uncompensated spillover; Range 
II). If the market value of an innovation does not exceed either cost, the innovation will not be 
disseminated and will be kept personal (i.e., non-accumulative innovation; Range III). Because 
it is highly likely that the number of minor innovations is far larger than the number of 
innovations that have high market values, the shape of innovation distribution slopes downward 
and to the right (Figure 1), and the distribution will have a long tail. This shape can be 
approximated simply by an exponential or Pareto distribution, but it is not necessary to assume 
a specific functional form of distribution. The important point is not the specific functional form 
of the distribution but its properties—if πηδ  , then non-accumulative innovations exist and 
there will be far more of them than of accumulative innovations.  
 
3.1.2  The origin of non-accumulative innovation 
It seems clear that non-accumulative innovations exist, but who creates them? Researchers can 
certainly create them, but so can ordinary workers. Usually, workers are implicitly assumed to 
do only what they are ordered to do and nothing else. Workers in this sense can be substituted 
for capital. If the cost of using capital is lower than that of using workers, capital inputs will be 
chosen rather than labor inputs. Generally, such robot-like workers have been assumed as the 
labor input in typical production functions. Of course, workers are not robots. They are human 
beings that are fundamentally different from machines—only humans can fix unexpected 
problems by creating innovations.  
 
3.1.2.1  Unexpected problems require innovation 
Actions taken to deal with expected incidents are determined by calculating the solutions to 
optimization problems that are built based on models constructed in advance. These calculations 
can be implemented by machines given a specific objective function, structural equations, 
parameter values, and necessary environmental information. However, this is not true if actions 
taken to deal with unexpected problems are required, because the models constructed in advance 
are guaranteed to be useful only for expected incidents, and they are not necessarily guaranteed 
to be applicable to unexpected incidents. When an unexpected problem occurs, workers in 
charge of the production first have to grasp the situation and then prioritize their actions. During 
these actions, the workers conduct two types of important intellectual activities: (1) discover 
unknown mechanisms that prevail in the surrounding environment and (2) invent new ways to 
manage the environment. That the problem is unexpected indicates that correct mechanisms for 
this particular situation are not known and need to be discovered, and on the basis of the newly 
discovered mechanisms, the structural equations and parameters in the model used for the plan 
of action should be revised. The revised model may indicate that there is no solution to resume 
efficient production, and new ways of managing the environment should be invented. Discovery 
and invention commonly involve the creation of something new, that is, innovation. 
 Machines deal with programmed tasks quite well, often much better than human 
beings. Conversely, machines cannot deal with non-programmed tasks. The performance of 
machines declines and often they stop working if unexpected problems occur because the 
machines do not have a program to deal with unexpected problems. When encountering 
unexpected problems, machines will immediately reach a dead end. They cannot solve 
unexpected problems by simply applying their pre-programmed optimization algorithms, and 
they cannot rewrite these algorithms to make them applicable to unexpected incidents. The 
revision or creation of models in the face of unexpected incidents can be implemented only by 
human beings.  
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3.1.2.2  Workers’ innovations to fix unexpected minor problems 
Is it either necessary or expected to utilize workers’ innovations for production? If workers are 
assumed to be robot-like beings, their abilities to solve unexpected problems will not be 
considered as part of production. However, it would be irrational for firms not to utilize 
workers’ innovative abilities if the firms know that workers possess these abilities. An ordinary 
worker’s ability to solve unexpected problems may be lower than that of educated and trained 
researchers, but the abilities of the former should be utilized fully for a firm to be rational. If 
anything, the workers’ abilities to fix unexpected problems appear indispensable in production 
processes because many minor but unforeseeable incidents actually occur. It would be quite 
inefficient if a team of specialized highly educated and trained employees dealt with all 
unexpected incidents, no matter how minor, and workers had to wait for the team to arrive at the 
locations where a minor unexpected incident happened. If, however, an unexpected but minor 
problem is fixed by a worker at the location where the problem occurred, production can 
proceed more efficiently and smoothly. The well-known “Kaizen” method in Japanese 
manufacturing companies may be a way to more completely exploit such opportunities (e.g., 
Lee et al., 1999). Besides innovations by suppliers, “user innovation” by consumers and end 
users has drawn attention recently (e.g., Baldwin et al., 2006). It is quite reasonable and rational 
for firms to fully exploit any opportunity to improve productivity whether its source is an 
innovation created by a researcher, ordinary worker, or user. 
 Finally, a worker’s ability to fix unexpected problems may seem to be part of the set 
of the worker’s learned skills or techniques, but that ability is fundamentally different from 
learned skills or techniques because learning skills and techniques and creating skills and 
techniques are completely different activities.    
 
3.1.3  Imperfections make workers’ innovations indispensable 
Although it is rational for employers to fully exploit workers’ innovations, in this section, I 
explain why workers’ innovations are truly an indispensable element in production. 
 
3.1.3.1  Imperfect accumulated innovations 
The current state of accumulated innovations is far from perfect, and, moreover, it always will 
be. Human beings will never know everything about the universe. Although we may be able to 
fully utilize known information, we still face many unexpected problems because the 
knowledge and technology we currently possess is imperfect. If accumulated innovations were 
perfect, machines that embody them would always work well in any situation. However, the 
accumulated innovations are not perfect, and thus machines malfunction occasionally or face 
other unexpected incidents. As stated previously, it is very efficient if workers’ innovations are 
utilized to fix these minor but unexpected troubles. Imperfection of accumulated innovations 
therefore necessitates workers’ innovations. 
 
3.1.3.2  Incomplete information caused by the division of labor 
Labor input has the property of decreasing marginal product, which is usually explained by 
congestion or redundancy. However, this explanation is not necessarily convincing. The 
inefficiency caused by congestion or redundancy can be removed by division of labor. If labor is 
sufficiently divided, there will be no congestion or redundancy, and the labor input will not 
exhibit decreasing marginal product. This suggests that division of labor cannot remove all 
inefficiencies with regard to labor input. With division of labor, each worker experiences only a 
fraction of the whole production process. These divided and isolated workers can access only a 
fraction of information on the whole production process. It is also difficult for a worker to know 
information that many other workers at different production sites accessed. Because all of the 
labor inputs are correlated owing to division of labor, this feature of fragmented information is 
especially problematic when workers engage in intellectual activities. Correlation of the entire 
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labor input indicates that all pieces of information on the whole production process need to be 
completely known to each worker to enable correct decision making. However, only a portion 
of the information on the whole production process is available to each worker; that is, each 
individual worker has incomplete information. When an unexpected problem occurs, workers 
with fragmented and incomplete information will make different, usually worse, decisions than 
those with complete information. As a result, overall productivity decreases. 
 For example, a CEO of a large company may know the overall plan of production but 
not the local and minor individual incidents that happen at each production site each day. In 
contrast, each worker at each production site may know little of the overall plan but a great deal 
about local and minor individual incidents that occur for each specific task each worker engages 
in at each production site. To be most efficient, even if many unexpected incidents happen, all 
of the workers and the CEO need to know all of the information on the entire process because 
all of the labor inputs are correlated owing to division of labor. However, it is nearly impossible 
for each worker to access all of the experiences of every other worker. Division of labor 
therefore leads to information fragmentation and obstructs any person from knowing all the 
information about the entire production process. 
 Each worker therefore must use incomplete information when encountering 
unexpected problems. Conjecturing the full detailed structure of the whole production process is 
an intellectual activity to discover unknown mechanisms. If a worker can discover more correct 
mechanisms even in the absence of complete information, the inefficiency is mitigated. Because 
inefficiency is inevitably generated by incomplete information resulting from division of labor, 
workers’ innovations are inevitably needed to mitigate inefficiency. However, completely 
mitigating the inefficiency will be impossible, and decisions based on less information will 
deviate from those made with full information. Sometimes actions that are relatively less urgent 
or important will be given priority, and efficiency will decline. As the division of labor 
increases, workers are less able to correctly estimate the full structure of the whole production 
process and less able to correctly prioritize actions to solve unexpected problems.  
 Division of labor cannot simultaneously solve inefficiency caused by congestion or 
redundancy and that caused by fragmented and incomplete information. Although a greater 
division of labor removes the former, it generates the latter. Inefficiency resulting from 
congestion and redundancy is probably much more serious than that caused by information 
fragmentation, and labor is divided almost completely despite the fact that information 
fragmentation harms productivity.  
 
3.1.3.3  Indispensable and economically important workers’ innovation 
Even if workers can innovate to fix unexpected minor troubles, the question remains whether 
these innovations are important economically. In general, most non-accumulative innovations 
are minor, which suggests that they may not be economically important. However, as discussed 
in Section 3.1.1, there will be far more minor innovations than major innovations. There are also 
usually far more ordinary workers than researchers and other highly trained or educated 
employees. In addition, the distributions of innovations for researchers and other highly trained 
employees and for ordinary workers are certainly different. Ordinary workers are likely to have 
a limited contribution to accumulative innovations (i.e., Ranges I and II in Figure 1) as 
compared to that of researchers and other highly trained employees, but the former will have a 
much larger contribution to non-accumulative innovations (Range III). As previously discussed, 
non-accumulative innovations are indispensable for production at each production site because 
of imperfect accumulative innovations and fragmented and incomplete information. Without 
worker-created non-accumulative innovations, the efficiency of production will decline 
considerably. This indispensability indicates that workers’ innovations are economically 
important. The economic importance of workers’ innovations is further examined in Section 
3.3. 
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3.2  The experience curve effect 
3.2.1  The experience curve effect and workers’ innovations 
Workers’ innovations are indispensable, but how are they created? The experience curve effect 
gives a clue to this mechanism. 
 
3.2.1.1  The theory of the experience curve effect 
The experience curve effect states that the more often a task is performed, the lower the cost of 
doing it. Workers who perform repetitive tasks exhibit an improvement in performance as the 
task is repeated a number of times. The primary idea of the experience curve effect (the 
“learning curve effect” in earlier literature) dates back to Wright (1936), Hirsch (1952), Alchian 
(1963), and Rapping (1965). The importance of the learning curve effect was emphasized by 
Boston Consulting Group (BCG) in the late 1960s and early 1970s (e.g., BCG, 1972). The 
experience (or learning) curve effect has been applied in many fields, including business 
management, strategy, and organization studies (e.g., on airplanes, Wright, 1936; Asher, 1956; 
Alchian, 1963; Womer and Patterson, 1983; in shipbuilding, Searle and Goody, 1945; on 
machine tools, Hirsch, 1952; in metal products, Dudley, 1972; in nuclear power plants, 
Zimmerman, 1982; Joskow and Rozanski, 1979; in chemical products, Lieberman, 1984; Argote 
et al., 1990; in food services, Reis, 1991). More recently, it has also been applied to technology 
and policy analysis, particularly energy technologies (e.g., Yelle 1979; Dutton and Thomas, 
1984; Hall and Howell, 1985; Lieberman, 1987; Argote and Epple, 1990; Criqui et al., 2000; 
McDonald and Schrattenholzer, 2001; van der Zwaan and Rablc, 2003, 2004; Miketa and 
Schrattenholzer, 2004; Papineau, 2006). An empirical problem of the experience curve effect is 
to distinguish dynamic learning effects from static economies of scale. After surveying 
empirical studies, Lieberman (1984) concluded that, in general, static scale economies are 
statistically significant but small in magnitude relative to learning-based economies (see also 
Preston and Keachie, 1964; Stobaugh and Townsend, 1975; Sultan, 1976; Hollander, 2003). 
 The experience curve effect is usually expressed by the following functional form: 
 
)1(
1
α
N NCC
                               (1) 
 
where C1 is the cost of the first unit of output of a task, CN is the cost of the nth unit of output, N 
is the cumulative amount of output and interpreted as experience of a worker engaging in the 
task, and α is a constant parameter ( 10  α ). 
N
N
C
C2  and 1 – α are often called the progress 
ratio and learning rate, respectively. This log-linear functional form is most commonly used 
probably because of its simplicity and good fit to data. Empirical studies have shown that α is 
usually between 0.6 and 0.9. Studies by BCG in the 1970s showed that experience curve effects 
for various industries range from 10–25% cost reductions for every doubling of output (i.e., 
85.058.0  α ) (e.g., BCG, 1972). Dutton and Thomas (1984) present the distribution of 
progress ratios obtained from a sample of 108 manufacturing firms. The ratios mostly range 
from 0.7 to 0.9 (i.e., 85.048.0  α ) and average 0.82 (i.e., 71.0α ). OECD/IEA (2000) 
argues that industry-level progress ratios have a similar distribution as the firm-level ones 
shown in Dutton and Thomas (1984; see also, e.g., Hirsch, 1956; Womer and Patterson, 1983; 
Womer, 1984; Ayres and Martinas, 1992; Williams and Terzian, 1993). 
 The magnitude of α (or equivalently the progress ratio or learning rate) may be 
affected by various factors (e.g., Hirsch, 1956; Adler and Clark, 1991; Pisano et al., 2001; 
Argote et al., 2003; Sorenson, 2003; Wiersma, 2007). Nevertheless, the average α is usually 
observed to be almost 0.7 (i.e., a progress ratio of 0.8 and a learning rate of 0.3) as shown in 
BCG (1972), Dutton and Thomas (1984), and OECD/IEA (2000). It therefore seems reasonable 
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to assume that α is 0.7 on average.  
 
3.2.1.2  Information conveyed by experience 
An important element that an experience conveys is information. By accumulating experiences 
of doing a task, a worker increases the amount of information known about the task and makes 
it more complete. In this sense, N, which indicates experience in equation (1), reflects the 
current amount of information a worker possesses about a task. Accumulated experiences will 
improve efficiency in implementing a task because the amount of information on the task 
increases. However, if other factors remain the same, the magnitude of improvement will 
diminish as N accumulates because the information on the task will approach saturation. 
 Let I be a set of the currently available maximum information on a task. Engaging in 
the task in a unit of period provides a subset of I to a worker. Engaging in more units of period 
(i.e., accumulating experience N) makes the information on the task the worker currently 
possesses ( I~ ) approach I (i.e., the difference between I~ and I diminishes). A part of the subset 
of I the worker acquires in a unit of period will overlap the part of the subset of I the worker 
acquires in the next period. With more complete information, accordingly, efficiency will 
improve. Because I~ → I as N → ∞, then the magnitude of improvement will asymptotically 
decrease as N increases. Nevertheless, this asymptotical decrease may not be a simple process. 
Some piece of information may be easily obtainable and some other piece may not be, and some 
portion of information may have a relatively large impact on efficiency and other portions have 
small effects. The functional form that describes the asymptotical decrease of the magnitude of 
improvement will depend on interaction between these effects. The log-linear functional form 
)1(
1
α
N NCC
 fits empirical data well and is simple, and thus it has been used mostly for the 
experience curve effect.  
 
3.2.1.3  Extending the concept of the experience curve effect  
Because the essence of experience is that it conveys information, the experience curve effect 
can be extended to a wide variety of tasks. The tasks need not be limited to a worker’s repeated 
actions, that is, tasks whose experiences are divided by periods. For example, consider that a 
human activity can be divided into many experiences, each of which is obtained by different 
workers. Each experience conveys a subset of information, and a part of the subset overlaps 
with subsets regarding other experiences. The experience curve effect will be applicable to this 
kind of task by interpreting N as a subset all worker experiences, so a task in a period whose 
experiences are divided by workers will be also applicable to the experience curve effect in the 
same way that a task performed by a worker whose experiences are divided by periods is. 
Extending this logic suggests that tasks applied to the experience curve effect should not be 
limited to the ones whose experiences are divided only by periods or workers. As long as the 
task is a human intellectual activity and its experiences are divided by factors other than periods 
or workers, the task will also be applicable to the experience curve effect because it has the 
common nature that each divided experience conveys only a subset of all the information that 
affects the worker’s intellectual activities. Nevertheless, the concept of the experience curve 
effect should not be expanded infinitely. It can be applied only to the tasks of workers, the 
performances of which differ depending on the amount of information the worker has.  
 
3.2.2  The experience curve effect in the technology input 
3.2.2.1  Dispersively embodied accumulative innovation in capital 
To understand the mechanism for the creation of non-accumulative innovations, it is first 
necessary to examine how workers are in contact with capital inputs and the accumulative 
innovations embodied in them at each production site. Any single machine or tool cannot 
embody all the accumulated innovations in human history. Only a portion of accumulated 
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innovations are embodied in each machine or capital input. Furthermore, different types of 
machines or tools embody different kinds of accumulative innovations. This relationship 
between accumulative innovation and capital suggests that accumulative innovations are varied, 
divisible, and dispersed among capital inputs. If there are negative effects of congestion and 
redundancy in the embodiment of accumulative innovation in capital, this division of 
accumulative innovation improves productivity. Embodying more types of accumulative 
innovations in a machine or tool may make it a more general purpose machine or tool. In 
implementing a specific task, however, a general purpose machine or tool will be less useful and 
efficient than a specialized one because congestion and redundancy of the accumulative 
innovations will occur and reduce efficiency.  
 Suppose that there is only one economy in the world and that all workers in the 
economy are identical. Let Y(A, K, L) be a production function where Y is production, A is 
technology (accumulated innovations), K is capital input, and L is labor input. A can be 
interpreted as indicating the total amount of technology and, at the same time, the total number 
of varieties of technology in the economy. Let also τA be the portion of A embodied on average 
in a unit of capital where τ is a positive parameter. To incorporate the idea that the division of A 
mitigates congestion and redundancy and improves efficiency for production, the following 
assumption is introduced: 
   0,,, 

τ
LKAτY  ,                           (2) 
 
which indicates that the smaller the value of τ (i.e., the smaller the magnitude of congestion and 
redundancy), the larger the production Y.   
 On the other hand, if τ is too small, there is the possibility that a piece of A is not 
embodied in any part of K. Without embodying any portion of A, K is no longer a machine or 
tool but merely a pile of useless materials. Avoiding this abnormal situation requires a condition 
that any K must embody at least some portion of A. If 1 Kτ , then the total amount of A used 
in the economy is AτAK  , and thus some portion of A is not embodied in any K, which 
indicates that the condition τK 1  is necessary for avoiding the abnormal situation and that  
1 Kτ  is the threshold value. As the rationale for the condition τK 1  with the threshold 
value 1 Kτ , it is assumed here that the total differential  τ,A,K,LdY  with respect to A and τ 
is positive such that  
 
      0

 dττ
τ,A,K,LYdA
A
τ,A,K,LYτ,A,K,LdY                (3) 
 
for 1 Kτ , and thus 
       0

 τ
τ,A,K,LY
dτ
dA
A
τ,A,K,LY
dτ
τ,A,K,LdY                 (4) 
 
for 1 Kτ , which means that if τ is smaller than the threshold value K–1, then the reverse effect 
of the amount of A on production is much larger than the effect of the division of A on 
production. If τK 1 , then any portion of A is embodied in some K, and thereby 0
dτ
dA  and 
    0
 τ
τ,A,K,LY
dτ
τ,A,K,LdY . 
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 Combining the characteristics of τ shown in inequalities (2) and (4) indicates that the 
optimal value of τ is K–1. As a result of the rational behavior of firms, the optimal dispersion of 
accumulative innovation in capital is obtained when 1 Kτ , and thus the portion of A 
embodied on average in a unit of capital is always 
 
K–1A 
 
in the economy. A worker faces K–1A units of accumulative innovations at any time when the 
worker uses a unit of capital.1 Because A indicates the total number of varieties of technology 
as well as the total amount of technology, dispersively embodied A in K indicates that a worker 
faces K–1 of varieties of A when the worker uses a unit of capital. 
 
3.2.2.2  Specialized or generalized machines or tools 
Suppose that the amount of A is fixed; that is, no new variety of innovation is added. If K 
increases and A remains fixed, the proportion of A embodied in a unit of K becomes smaller 
because the proportion of A embodied in a unit of K is kept equal to K–1A. A smaller K–1A means 
that machines or tools become more specialized because the purpose of a machine or tool 
embodying less A will be more limited. The types of machines or tools used will change even if 
A does not increase. If K increases in this case, machines and tools will become more 
specialized and vice versa. The variety and type of machines or tools, that is, how specialized or 
generalized they are, depend not only on A but also on K.  
 Note, however, that generalized does not necessarily mean advanced. On the contrary, 
general purpose machines or tools are more primitive, and conversely, special purpose ones are 
more advanced. To be general purpose, machines or tools must rely more on basic or core 
technologies, and many specialized functions will be downgraded. 
 
3.2.2.3  Effective technology input 
As argued in Section 3.2.1, the experience curve effect can be applied to a task as long as the 
task is an intellectual creative activity and the experiences can be divided by some factor. The 
experience curve effect is applicable to the activity of creating non-accumulative innovations to 
supplement imperfect accumulative innovations because (1) the activity is an intellectual 
creative activity and (2) the experiences can be divided by varieties of A in K a worker 
encounters. A worker encounters a portion of the accumulated innovations (K–1A) when the 
worker uses a unit of capital. The portion of accumulated innovations conveys a subset of all the 
information on accumulated innovations and a part of the subset overlaps with those conveyed 
in other portions of accumulated innovations that other workers encounter.  
 A worker encounters a unique combination of varieties of accumulative innovations 
(K–1A) per unit capital. Let NA be a worker’s average encounter frequency (i.e., the worker’s 
experience) with each variety of accumulative innovations per unit capital in a period. As K–1A 
increases, the number of varieties per unit capital increases; thus, NA will decrease because the 
probability of encountering each of the varieties in K–1A in a period decreases. The amount of 
K–1A therefore will be inversely proportional to a worker’s experience on a variety per capital 
NA such that  
 
1



K
AβN AA  
                                                          
1 In this paper, it is assumed that there is only one economy in the world. However, actually there are many smaller 
economies and a small economy may utilize only a small portion of A; i.e., the size of economy will matter to the 
optimal value of τ if there are many economies of various sizes. The problem of the size of economy as well as the 
problem of aggregation is discussed more in detail in Harashima (2009). 
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where βA is a positive constant. Standardizing the worker’s average encounter frequency βA 
equal to unity, then  
 
1



K
AN A .                              (5) 
 
 Let 
ANA
C ,  be the amount of inefficiency resulting from imperfect technology (which 
is equivalent to imperfect accumulative innovations) embodied in capital when a worker utilizes 
a variety of accumulative innovations in K–1A in a period. 
ANA
C ,  does indicates not the 
inefficiency initially generated by imperfect technology but the one remaining after being 
mitigated by workers’ innovations. Costs increase proportionally to increases in inefficiency; 
thus, 
ANA
C ,  also indicates costs. Conversely, 
1
,

ANA
C  can be interpreted as a productivity in 
supplementing imperfect technology by creating non-accumulative innovations when a worker 
utilizes a variety of accumulative innovations in K–1A in a period. The creation of 
non-accumulative innovations will increase as the frequency of a worker encountering a variety 
of accumulative innovations in K–1A increases (i.e., the productivity in supplementing imperfect 
technology by creating non-accumulative innovations will increase as the number of 
experiences increases). Hence, the inefficiency 
ANA
C ,  will decrease as the encounter frequency 
increases. The experience curve effect indicates that inefficiency 
ANA
C ,  declines (i.e., 
productivity 1,

ANA
C  increases) as a worker’s average encounter frequency on a variety per unit 
capital (NA) increases (i.e., K-1A becomes smaller) such that  
 
)1(
1,,
α
AANA NCC A
  ,                           (6) 
 
where 1,AC  is the inefficiency when 1AN . Note that α is the constant parameter ( 10  α ) 
used in equation (1). 
 In addition, the amount of technology input per unit capital will increase as 1, ANAC  
increases (i.e., 
ANA
C ,  decreases) because the inefficiency is mitigated by an increased amount 
of workers’ innovations. Thus, the amount of technology input per unit capital when a worker 
uses a variety of accumulative innovations in K–1A will be directly proportional to 1,

ANA
C  (i.e., 
inversely proportional to 
ANA
C , ) such that 
 
ANA
A
A C
γ
K
AW
,
1


   ,                           (7) 
 
where WA is the amount of technology input per unit capital when a worker utilizes a unique 
combination of varieties of accumulative innovations in K–1A, and γA is a positive constant (i.e., 
γA indicates the amount of technology input per unit capital when a worker utilizes a unique 
combination of varieties of accumulative innovations K–1A in a period when 1, ANAC ). 
Substituting equations (5) and (6) into equation (7) gives 
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 
α
A
A
α
A
A
α
AA
A
NA
A
A K
A
C
γ
K
A
K
AC
γ
K
A
NC
γ
K
A
C
γW
A











 
1,
1
1,
1
1,,
.       (8) 
 
 As discussed in Section 3.2.2.1, the amount of technology embodied in a unit capital is 
K–1A. Because technology is imperfect, however, that level of technology input cannot be 
effectively realized. At the same time, the inefficiency resulting from the imperfections is 
mitigated by non-accumulative innovations created by ordinary workers even though it is not 
completely removed. Equation (8) indicates that the magnitude of mitigation depends on K–1A, 
and that, with the mitigation, technology input per unit capital is effectively not equal to K–1A 
but directly proportionate to 
α
A
A
A K
A
C
γW 


1,
. By equation (8), therefore, the effective 
technology input per unit capital ( A~ ) is  
 
α
AAA K
AωWυA 

~                            (9) 
 
where υA and ωA are positive constant parameters and 
1A,
AA
A C
γυω  .  
 
3.2.3  The experience curve effect in the labor input 
The task of mitigating the inefficiency resulting from fragmented and incomplete information 
caused by the division of labor satisfies the condition for applying the experience curve effect 
(Section 3.2.1). As shown in Section 3.1.3, workers’ innovations reduce this inefficiency. In 
addition, production processes are divided by workers as part of the division of labor. Each 
worker encounters only a portion of the whole production process, a portion of the process 
conveys only a portion of information on the whole production process, and the information 
overlaps partially with that on other processes that other workers encounter. Hence, the 
experience curve effect can be applied to this task. Because labor is divided fully at the global 
level, inefficiency mitigation activities are correlated at the global level. 
 Let NL be the production processes a worker encounters (i.e., the experience of a 
worker); it indicates the proportion of all production processes in the economy (N), which is 
here normalized such that N = 1. A proportion of the production process conveys a subset of all 
the information on the production process, and a part of the subset overlaps with subsets of 
information on processes that other workers encounter. Remember, in this discussion, I am 
assuming that there is only one economy in the world and that all workers are identical. Thus, 
because the experience of a worker (NL) is inversely proportionate to the number of workers, 
then  
 
LL βLN 1  
 
where L is the number of workers in the economy and βL is a constant.  LNβ LL   indicates 
the total of all production processes in the economy such that NβL  . Because N = 1, then 
 
1 LNL  .                              (10) 
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Let 
LNL
C ,  be the magnitude of inefficiency in a worker’s labor input caused by fragmented and 
incomplete information when each worker’s experience is NL. 
LNL
C ,  indicates not the 
inefficiency initially generated by fragmented and incomplete information but the inefficiency 
that remains after mitigation by a worker’s innovations. Costs will increase proportionally with 
increases in inefficiency, and thus 
LNL
C ,  also indicates costs. 
1
,

LNL
C  can be interpreted as a 
productivity in a worker’s labor input, which increases as the amount of mitigation by the 
worker’s innovations increases. 
 
LNL
C ,  increases as the amount of individually available information (i.e., experience) 
increases. The increased amount of information enables a worker to discover more correct 
mechanisms of the production processes, and this discovery reduces the inefficiency in a 
worker’s labor input. As mentioned previously, the experience curve effect can be applied to 
this inefficiency mitigation mechanism. The experience curve effect indicates that 
LNL
C ,  
declines as the experience of a worker (NL) increases (i.e., the number of workers deceases) 
such that  
 
)1(
1,,
α
LLNL NCC L
  ,                          (11) 
 
where 1,LC  is the inefficiency when NL = 1 (i.e., NL = N and L = 1). Note again that α is the 
constant parameter ( 10  α ) used in equation (1). 
 In addition, because the amount of a worker’s provision of labor input increases as 
productivity ( 1,

LNL
C ) increases (i.e., 
LNL
C ,  decreases), then the amount of a worker’s provision 
of labor input ( LWL
1 ) is directly proportional to 1,

LNL
C  (i.e., inversely proportional to 
LNL
C , ) 
such that  
 
LNL
LL
C
γ
L
W
,
  ,                             (12) 
 
where WL is the total amount of workers’ provision of labor input that is supplemented by 
worker’s innovations to mitigate the inefficiency resulting from fragmented and incomplete 
information, and γL is a constant (i.e., γL indicates the output per worker in a period when 
1, LNLC ). Substituting equations (10) and (11) into equation (12) gives 
 
 
α
L
L
α
L
L
α
LL
L
NL
L
L LC
γL
LC
γL
NC
γL
C
γW
L 1,
1
1,
1
1,,
  .              (13) 
 
 The inefficiency caused by fragmented and incomplete information constrains the 
labor provision by workers. As division of labor is widened (i.e., as L increases), the labor 
provision by workers is more constrained. The inefficiency, however, is mitigated by 
innovations created by workers, but it cannot be completely removed by workers’ innovations. 
Hence, the labor input that is effectively provided by workers is not simply proportional to L. 
Equation (13) indicates that, instead of L, the labor input effectively provided by workers is 
directly proportional to α
L
L
L LC
γW
1,
 ; thus, the effective labor input L~  is  
 
α
LLL LωWυL ~  ,                          (14) 
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where υL and ωL are positive constant parameters and 
1L,
LL
L C
γυω  .  
 
3.2.4  The experience curve effect and the capital input 
As with A~  and L~ , an inefficiency with regard to the capital input K may exist, and this 
inefficiency may be solved by intellectual activities of workers. If such inefficiency exists, the 
effective capital input would not be equal to K. However, I was unable to find a factor that 
significantly necessitates a worker’s intellectual activities to lessen inefficiencies in utilizing 
capital, in particular inefficiencies that result from imperfectness or incompleteness of 
information on capital. Therefore, I have assumed that capital input does not necessitate 
workers’ innovations. However, capital input is constrained by another element that is basically 
irrelevant to workers’ intellectual activities. It is impossible for each worker to use all capital 
inputs existing in the economy; each worker can access only a fraction of the total amount. This 
accessibility constraint sets bounds to the use of capital. Nevertheless, the accessibility is 
basically irrelevant in terms of worker innovation because accessibilities of workers in the 
world are not correlated with each other at the global level and thus it is not difficult for a 
worker to find a correct way to access capital inputs when an unexpected incident occurs. 
Therefore, information on accessibility is not incomplete, and it is enough for a worker to know 
only local information with regard to accessibility to capital. Therefore, there is little 
differentiation among workers in finding correct ways to access capital inputs, and as a 
consequence, there is little differentiation in the workers’ experiences. 
 Machines or tools are not necessarily in constant operation during production; they are 
idle during some periods. A worker often uses various machines or tools in turn in a period, or 
equivalently several workers often use the same machine or tool in turn in a period. Let σK be 
the portion of K used by a worker on average where  10  σσ  is a positive parameter. 
Because the total sum of K used in the economy must not be smaller than K, σKLK  , 
σL 1 , and thereby 11  σL  for L1 . It is highly likely that production increases if more 
K is used per worker, in which case  
   0

σ
σ,A,K,LY  .                          (15) 
 
Condition (15) and the constraint 11  σL  lead to a unique steady state value of σ such that 
σ = 1, which indicates that each worker uses all K existing in the economy. Clearly, that is 
impossible—accessibility to capital is not limitless. Even if a worker wants to use K installed at 
a distant location, it is usually meaningless to do so because it is too costly. Thus, it is highly 
likely that there is a boundary of accessibility with regard to location. A worker can use only a 
small portion of K installed in the small area around the worker. That is, the value of the 
parameter σ has an upper bound such that  
 
σσL 1  ,                             (16) 
 
where  10  σσ  is a positive constant. With the upper bound σ , by conditions (15) and 
(16), the optimal portion of K used by a worker on average ( K~ ) for L1  is  
 
KσK ~ .                               (17) 
 
 The parameter σ  represents a worker’s accessibility limit to capital with regard to 
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location.2 The average value of σ  in the economy will depend on the availability of physical 
transportation facilities. Location constraints, however, are not limited to physical transportation 
facilities. For example, law enforcement, regulations, the financial system, and other factors will 
also influence accessibility. The value of σ  reflects the combined effects of all of these factors. 
The values of σ  with regard to workers who are obliged to work at a designated location using 
fixed machines in a factory (e.g., workers in manufacturing industries) may be nearly identical. 
However, values for workers in other jobs (e.g., in service industries) will be heterogeneous 
depending on conditions. Even in manufacturing industries, workers engage in a variety of 
activities (e.g., negotiating with financial institutions or marketing), so the values of σ  will 
also be heterogeneous in manufacturing industries. 
 Suppose that the density of capital per unit area is identical in the industrial area in the 
economy with an upper bound of σ .3 An increase of the total sum of K indicates an increase of 
the density of K in the industrial area; thus, the portion of K used by a worker also increases at 
the same rate as K. On the other hand, an increase of the total sum of L does not indicate any 
change of the density of K in the industrial area, and the portion of K used by a worker does not 
change.  
 
3.2.5  Related theories 
3.2.5.1  Learning-by-doing  
The theory of learning-by-doing originated in Arrow (1962), who argues that productivity is 
improved by workers’ regularly repeating the same type of action through practice, 
self-perfection, and minor innovation. Arrow-type growth models assume that productivity is 
proportionate to accumulated investments in capital or production, which represent the 
accumulated effects of workers’ learning-by-doing (e.g., Sheshinski, 1967; Romer, 1986). If 
accumulated experiences obtained through learning-by-doing are proportionate not to 
accumulated innovations (A) but to accumulated past investments in capital or production and 
are heterogeneous across economies, current significant income differences across economies, 
which are difficult to explain by attributing the fundamental cause to A because A is 
homogenous among economies, can be explained. Arrow (1962) argues that different 
economies have different production functions because of heterogeneous amounts of 
accumulated learning-by-doing.  
 The concept of learning-by-doing is similar to the concept of the effective technology 
and labor inputs A~  and L~  in some aspects. They both focus on activities of ordinary workers. 
Indeed, some researchers base the foundation of the experience curve effect on the theory of 
learning-by-doing (e.g., Hall and Howell, 1985; Adler and Clark, 1991; Nemet, 2006). However, 
the concepts are different in the following important aspects. 
 
 Learning-by-doing mostly consists of activities to learn already-uncovered knowledge, 
technologies, or ideas, but the creation of non-accumulative innovations by workers 
consists only of activities to create something new.  
 Experiences obtained through learning-by-doing in Arrow-type growth models accumulate 
in the economy, but non-accumulative innovations created by workers do not accumulate.  
 The amount of accumulated learning-by-doing in Arrow-type growth models is 
proportionate to accumulated investments in physical capital and production. The amount 
of non-accumulative innovations to supplement imperfect accumulated innovations is 
                                                          
2 If there are many economies with various sizes, each economy’s value of σ  may be different. The effect of the 
size of economy on σ  is discussed in Harashima (2009). 
3 An industrial area is considered here to be an area that is appropriate for economic activities and excludes deserts, 
deep forests, mountains, and other inaccessible areas. This concept is important when we consider the size of 
economy, which is examined in detail in Harashima (2009).   
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proportionate to accumulated innovations (A) and inversely proportionate to the physical 
capital input (K). The amount of non-accumulative innovations to mitigate the inefficiency 
resulting from fragmented and incomplete information is proportionate to the labor input 
(L). 
 
3.2.5.2  Human capital 
Human capital usually refers to a worker’s knowledge and skills that help increase productivity 
and performance at work and that are obtained by intentionally investing in education and 
training. The concept of human capital in the modern neoclassical economic literature dates 
back to Mincer (1958) and has been studied widely since Becker (1962, 1964). Human capital is 
similar to physical capital. Anyone can invest in it, and it is substitutable for physical capital and 
labor. Becker (1962) argues that investing in human capital means all activities that influence 
future real income through the embedding of resources in people. Investing in human capital 
takes the forms of formal schooling, on-the-job training, off-the-job training, medical treatment, 
and similar activities (e.g., Weisbroad, 1966; Lynch, 1991). Some researchers have argued that 
the currently observed international differences in investments and growth rates are closely 
related with human capital (e.g., Lucas, 1990; Barro, 1991; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994).  
 The concept of human capital is similar to the concept of effective labor and 
technology inputs ( A~  and L~ ) as well as learning-by-doing concepts in some aspects. These 
concepts commonly focus on the activities of ordinary workers. In Becker (1964), general and 
specific human capital inputs are distinguished because general human capital is useful not only 
with current workers but also with potential workers. Specific human capital in this sense is 
useful only with a current worker in a current job. Although researchers have argued that 
generating convincing examples of meaningful specific human capital is difficult (e.g., Lazear, 
2003), specific human capital in the sense of Becker (1964) may consist partly of 
non-accumulative innovations. However, the concepts are different in the following 
fundamental aspects. 
 
 A worker’s human capital mostly consists of knowledge, technology, or ideas that have 
already been uncovered by other persons, but the creation of non-accumulative innovations 
by workers consists only of activities to create something new.  
 Human capital obtained through education and training accumulates, but non-accumulative 
innovations do not.  
 The amount of human capital is proportionate to variables that are unrelated to A, K, or L 
(e.g., periods of education or training). The amount of non-accumulative innovations to 
supplement imperfect accumulated innovations is proportionate to accumulated 
innovations (A) and inversely proportionate to physical capital input (K). The amount of 
non-accumulative innovations to mitigate the inefficiency resulting from fragmented and 
incomplete information is proportionate to the labor input (L). 
 
 These differences indicate that, as with learning-by-doing, the core concepts of 
human capital and effective technology and labor inputs are fundamentally different. 
      The concept of effective labor and technology inputs focuses more specifically on 
creativity and non-accumulative innovations. The concept of human capital appears 
infinitely elastic, and its broad but ambiguous nature may confuse arguments. Many 
studies of human capital have narrowed the scope to education or training to avoid this 
ambiguity, although the concept of education still appears too broad for analyses of 
economic growth (e.g., Krueger and Lindahl, 2001).  
 
3.3  Production function 
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3.3.1  Effective production function 
Suppose that production requires some strictly positive minimum amounts of A, K, and L. In 
addition, suppose that A, K, and L each do not exhibit increasing marginal product; that is, 
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
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LKAf
L
, then for sufficiently large A, K, and L, the 
production function is approximated by the production function in which any of A, K, and L 
exhibits constant marginal product such that  
     54321 ψψLψKψAψY   ,                   (18) 
 
where ψi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) are constants. Here, by the assumption that production requires some 
strictly positive minimum amounts of A, K, and L, then   0,,0 LKf ,   0,0, LAf , and 
  00,, KAf . Among the approximated production functions (18), the production function that 
also satisfies this minimum requirement condition is  
 
 AKLψY 1  . 
 
If ψ1 is standardized such that ψ1 = 1, then 
 
AKLY   .                              (19) 
 
 Production function (19) appears intuitively understandable. Each of L workers uses K 
capital inputs per worker with A amount of technologies utilized in each K.4 However, 
production function (19) cannot be realized as it is, because there are various constraints caused 
by various imperfections, as I argued in Section 3.2. The effective amounts of technology and 
labor inputs are not A and L but A~  and L~ , and the portion of K usable for a worker on 
average is not K but K~ . Hence, the approximated production function is effectively  
 
LKAY ~~~  .                              (20) 
 
Here, by equations (9), (14), and (17), 
 
ααα
LA
α
L
α
A LKAωωσLKωσK
AωLKA 

 1~~~  .                (21) 
 
Rational firms utilize inputs fully so as to maximize Y, and by equations (20) and (21), the 
approximate effective production function (AEPF) can be represented as 
 
ααα
LA LKAωωσY  1  .                         (22) 
 
3.3.2  The approximate effective production function 
AEPF has the following properties, which have been widely assumed for production functions 
and are consistent with data across economies and time periods: a Cobb-Douglas functional 
                                                          
4 Remember that all workers are assumed to be identical.  
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form, a labor share of about 70%, and strict Harrod neutrality. The function therefore also has 
decreasing marginal products of labor, capital, and technology.  
 
3.3.2.1  Cobb-Douglas functional form 
The rationale and microfoundation of the Cobb-Douglas functional form have been long argued, 
but no consensus has been reached. For example, Jones (2005) argues that Cobb-Douglas 
production functions are induced if it is assumed that ideas are drawn from Pareto distributions. 
Growiec (2008), however, shows that Clayton-Pareto class of production functions that nest 
both the Cobb-Douglas functions and the CES are induced by assuming that each of the unit 
factor productivities is Pareto-distributed, dependence between these marginal distributions is 
captured by the Clayton copula, and that local production functions are CES. AEPF provides an 
alternative rationale and microfoundation of the Cobb-Douglas functional form. AEPF is the 
typical Cobb-Douglas production function, and the keys of its Cobb-Douglas functional form 
are workers’ innovations and the experience curve effect.    
 
3.3.2.2  A 70% labor share 
The parameter α indicates the labor share in the distribution of income. Data in DME show that 
labor share is about 70% (see e.g., OECD.Stat Extracts5). No persuasive rationale has been 
presented on why the labor share is usually about 70%, but AEPF can offer one. In AEPF, the 
value of α is derived from the experience curve effect, and the average value of α has been 
shown to be about 70% in many empirical studies on the experience curve effect (e.g., Hirsch, 
1956; Womer and Patterson, 1983; Dutton and Thomas, 1984; Womer, 1984; Ayres and 
Martinas, 1992: Williams and Terzian, 1993; OECD/IEA, 2000), which implies that workers’ 
average rate of reducing inefficiencies is bounded. This boundary probably exists because 
newly added information decreases as the number of experiences increases and also because the 
marginal efficiency in a worker’s analyzing, utilizing, and managing information (i.e., in 
creating innovations) decreases as the amount of information increases.  
 
3.3.2.3  Strict Harrod neutrality and balanced growth  
Because AEPF is a Cobb-Douglas production function, any of Harrod, Hicks, and Solow 
neutralities can be assumed as the type of technology change embodied in it. However, AEPF is 
Harrod neutral in the strict sense such that a unit of A is neither α
α
A 

1  (Solow neutral) nor 
αA  (Hicks neutral) but A–1 because a unit of A is defined before the functional form of AEPF 
is induced using the experience curve effect. This strict Harrod neutrality is a necessary 
condition for a balanced growth path. In the balanced growth equilibrium, the capital intensity 
of the economy Y–1K is kept constant, and L–1Y, L–1K, and A grow at the same rate. Because 
AEPF is strictly Harrod neutral, it is possible for a growth model based on AEPF to achieve a 
balanced growth path. 
 At first glance, the essential factor behind the strict Harrod neutrality in AEPF appears 
to be that both A~  and L~  are subject to workers’ intellectual activities and the experience 
curve effect. However, this view is somewhat superficial. In a deeper sense, there is a more 
essential factor. For strict Harrod neutrality to be achieved, it is necessary that both AEPF with 
constant L and AEPF with constant A be homogeneous of degree 1 with regard to (A and K) and 
(K and L), respectively. These conditions are satisfied in AEPF because A~  is 
α
A K
Aω 

 , and 
A~  therefore is not proportionate simply to A but to K–1A. That is, strict Harrod neutrality 
requires various types of accumulative innovations in A to be dispersed in K, which means that 
                                                          
5 http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx 
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A and K are closely related (like two sides of the same coin). Production (Y) increases at the 
same rate as A and K; thus, the capital intensity (Y–1K) is constant.  
 As shown in Section 3.2, the nature of dispersive accumulative innovations originates 
in the optimization of firms to minimize inefficiencies caused by congestion and redundancy of 
A (i.e., to maximize effects of the division of A). Because technology input is optimal when 
capital is as specialized as possible, then capital is actually as specialized as possible by the 
optimizing behaviors of firms, which implies that the very essence of the strict Harrod neutrality 
and the balanced growth path lies in the optimizing behaviors of rational firms.  
 
3.3.3  AEPF and Hayek’s view of knowledge 
As summarized in Section 2, knowledge of unexpected problems and corresponding innovations 
is an important element in the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place. 
Therefore, AEPF can be regarded as a model that is built on and correctly reflects Hayek’s view 
of knowledge. 
 
4  WORKERS’ INNOVATIONS IN SPEs 
 
4.1  The nature of the knowledge 
An important aspect of the knowledge of unexpected problems and the corresponding workers’ 
innovations is that the knowledge consists of not only simple data but also of a great deal of 
descriptive information, including ambiguous impressions, feelings, perceptions, guesses, 
intuitions, and hypotheses. The term “unexpected” is key here. Because an unexpected problem 
is not known in advance, the worker in a specific situation examines the problem using human 
intelligence. In some cases, these examinations may be implemented unconsciously. The 
knowledge includes information on all the results and processes of the examinations 
implemented through human intelligence and other related information. Therefore, the 
characteristics of unexpected problems and the corresponding innovations cannot be described 
by a few simple predetermined symbols or data inputs. A great deal of descriptive information is 
necessary to explain and understand this type of knowledge.  
 The nature of this type of knowledge puts an important constraint on its use: 
computers are of limited use in dealing with this type of knowledge. Computers can deal with 
phenomena that are already known and are categorized ex ante as standardized simple patterns, 
symbols, or data if the computer is pre-programmed to deal with these patterns, symbols, or data. 
At present, computers cannot deal with elements that have not been pre-programmed, which 
include the previously mentioned ambiguous impressions, feelings, perceptions, and intuitions 
that workers use when dealing with unexpected problems.  
 
4.2  Incentives 
4.2.1  Incentive and productivity 
Workers’ innovations are an important element of productivity, but most workers will generate 
innovations only when given an incentive. The strength of the incentive can be measured by the 
amount of reward or punishment a worker receives, and if rewards or punishments are increased, 
the incentive will increase. In this paper, the incentive for a worker to generate innovations is 
modeled as 
 
   αμμαμαμ ~
22
~~
2121   , 
 
where  10 11  μμ  is the subjective probability that a worker receives a reward for 
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generating an innovation (e.g., a wage increase);  10 22  μμ  is the subjective probability 
that a worker receives a punishment for not generating an innovation (e.g., a wage decrease); 
and  1~0~  αα  is the worker’s share in the increased income owing to a worker’s innovation. 
Therefore, μ1 and μ2 represent the likelihood and ᾶ represents the size of the rewards and 
punishments. μ1 = 1 (μ2 = 1) indicates that a reward (punishment) is 100% certain for generating 
(not generating) an innovation, and a value of 0 indicates that there is no possibility of a reward 
(punishment). Thereby, if rewards and punishments are both entirely certain, 1
2
21  μμ , and 
if rewards and punishments are both impossible, 0
2
21  μμ .  
 Suppose that an entrepreneur gives the rewards and punishments to workers surely 
based on information about the workers’ generation of innovations. Then, the subjective 
probability and incentive of a worker depend on the quality of the information the entrepreneur 
can obtain. If the information is perfectly obtained, 1
2
21  μμ ; if the information is imperfect, 
1
2
0 21  μμ . In particular, if the entrepreneur obtains no information, then 0
2
21  μμ . 
Therefore, the incentive αμμ ~
2
21   can be substituted with 
 
αμ ~  
 
where μ (0 ≤ μ ≤1) is the subjective probability that the information the entrepreneur obtains is 
perfect. μ = 1 indicates that workers are 100% confident of the perfectness of the information, 
and μ = 0 indicates that workers are completely confident the entrepreneur obtains no 
information. Obviously, if 0 < μ < 1, there is some uncertainty about the perfectness of the 
information. 
 As shown in Section 3, 11,

AC  represents the productivity of supplementing imperfect 
technology by creating non-accumulative innovations, and 11,

LC  is the productivity of a 
worker’s labor input, which increases as the amount of mitigation by the worker’s innovations 
increases. Because the productivity of generating a worker’s innovation depends on incentives, 
1
1,

AC  and 
1
1,

LC  are functions of ᾶ and μ such that    11 ~ αμCA,  and    11 ~ αμCL, .  
 If the incentive is stronger, a worker works harder to generate innovations and 
productivity increases. Hence, productivities    11 ~ αμCA,  and    11 ~ αμCL,  will be enhanced 
as μ and ᾶ increase, such that 
 
  
0
~ 1
1 
 
μ
αμCA,  and    0~ 11 

μ
αμCL,  for 10  μ  ,          (23) 
 
and 
 
    0~ ~
1
1 
 
α
αμCA,  and    0~ ~
1
1 
 
α
αμCL,  for 1~0  α  .         (24) 
 
 Here, let productivity LAωωσ  in AEPF be Ω. By equation (22),   
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 ααα LKΩAY  1  .                           (25) 
 
Because 11,

AC  and 
1
1,

LC  are functions of αμ ~ , then, by equations (8), (9), (13) and (14), 
productivity Ω is also a function of αμ ~ , such that  αμΩ ~ , and by inequalities (23) and (24),  
 
0

μ
Ω  for 10  μ  
 
and 
 
 0~ 

α
Ω  for 1~0  α  . 
 
 It is highly likely that Ω(0) is very low and far smaller than  αμΩ ~  for μ ≈ 1 and 
αα ~  where, as shown in equation (25), α indicates the labor share in the distribution of 
income in the AEPF and is about 0.7 in most DMEs (see e.g., OECD.Stat Extracts6). With little 
incentive, workers will generate little innovation and the level of production will remain very 
low. Nevertheless, even if the value of Ω(0) is very low, it will not be zero because even if there 
is no incentive ( 0~ αμ ), a worker may generate innovations for a variety of reasons, including 
personal curiosity, an unconscious sense of duty, to relieve boredom, or attempt to gain the 
admiration of other workers.7 In AEPF, the value of Ω(0) depends on the values of CA,1(0), 
CL,1(0), γA, and γL. 
 
4.2.2  Incentives in DMEs 
The AEPF indicates that higher values of ωA and ωL yield higher levels of production. 
Entrepreneurs can gain more income if workers generate more innovations. Therefore, 
entrepreneurs seek out workers’ innovations that bring in profits and they fully pursue 
exploiting the opportunities that workers’ innovations provide. Entrepreneurs will make efforts 
to obtain the knowledge and provide sufficient incentives to workers. To offer incentives to 
workers, entrepreneurs will explicitly or implicitly promise to give workers a share of the 
increased income gained by the workers’ innovations as a reward. Of course, the division of 
labor requires discipline, and the role of an individual worker in a production process is limited. 
Workers’ activities deviating from their designated roles are usually prohibited. Nevertheless, 
within the given role of an individual worker, entrepreneurs will encourage workers to innovate.  
 In a DME, there are many entrepreneurs dispersed across many production sites, and 
these entrepreneurs act independently of each other while attempting to fully exploit the 
opportunities that workers’ innovations provide. Thanks to decentralization, therefore, 
entrepreneurs, as a group, recognize all pieces of the knowledge and provide sufficient incentive 
to all workers located at all of the widely dispersed production sites. The value of μ will be 
maximized through competition among entrepreneurs, and thereby high μ (μ ≈ 1) is guaranteed.
 In DMEs, wages are determined through competition, and the overall worker’s share 
converges at α at equilibrium if the production function is the Cobb–Douglas type, which is the 
case in the AEPF. Hence, the worker’s share for the extra income gained by workers’ 
innovations (ᾶ) will also converge at α. Therefore, in DMEs with μ ≈ 1,  
                                                          
6 http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx 
7 An example of incentives other than wage increases and promotions is those in a war economy. The reward for 
workers is victory, which can be a strong incentive for workers to generate innovations if the war is strongly 
supported by the workers.  
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 ααμ ~  . 
 
Because α is about 0.7 in most DMEs (see e.g., OECD.Stat Extracts8), the incentive for workers 
to generate innovations will be far above zero. Hence, workers will generate a sufficiently large 
number of innovations in DMEs, and thereby DMEs intrinsically can function sufficiently 
productively. 
 
4.2.3  Incentives in SPEs  
Unlike the case in DMEs, the incentive for workers to implement intellectual activities is not 
spontaneously generated in SPEs but needs to be intentionally created by a CPB because of 
centralization. In Lange’s model, the incentive for innovation is not explicitly described. If 
anything, the incentive is not supposed to be a necessary element in Lange’s model because 
workers are described as robot-like beings who only implement routine non-intellectual tasks 
according to predetermined rules. On the other hand, the AEPF indicates that workers’ 
intellectual activities are indispensable, and without an incentive for workers to generate 
innovations (i.e., if Ω[0]), production is far below the level that is achieved with incentives (i.e., 
Ω[α]). The AEPR, therefore, indicates that an SPE in the pure Lange-type model cannot 
function as productively as a DME, and the model should be modified to incorporate a 
mechanism that gives workers the incentive to innovate. 
 For a sufficient incentive (i.e., for a CPB to achieve μ = 1), ex post rewards (or 
punishments) must be given to a worker who generated (or did not generate) an innovation. 
Correctly providing ex post rewards and/or punishments requires that a CPB, which centrally 
makes decisions on wages, promotions, demotions, and other aspects of personnel management, 
correctly knows and evaluates each worker’s innovations. Therefore, knowledge about all of the 
unexpected problems and the corresponding workers’ innovations in all the dispersed 
production sites must be perfectly reported and transmitted by managers at the sites to the CPB. 
If the knowledge is not perfectly transmitted, wages will be distorted.  
 Nevertheless, the SPE could function well if the incentive for workers to innovate 
were replaced with a simple rule and the CPB could easily monitor the implementation of the 
rule. However, rules cannot substitute for incentives because of the previously discussed nature 
of the knowledge. The rule would need to be unconditionally implemented by workers without 
the utilization of their intelligence—otherwise, it is not a rule. Thus, rules cannot replace 
incentives. Therefore, for an SPE to function as productively as a DME, Lange’s model must be 
modified to incorporate a mechanism by which all managers located in dispersed production 
sites report the knowledge perfectly to the CPB. 
 
4.3  Transmission and utilization of knowledge  
Because of the nature of knowledge that was discussed in Section 4.1, the following condition 
needs to be satisfied for knowledge to be perfectly transmitted to the CPB.  
 
Condition 1: Managers must not be considered to be robot-like; they must be considered as 
human beings capable of implementing intellectual activities.  
 
For managers to fully know and evaluate unexpected problems and the corresponding workers’ 
innovations, they need to understand how a worker measured, analyzed, and evaluated an 
unexpected problem and then generated the corresponding innovations. Managers may have to 
almost duplicate the processes of workers’ intellectual activities to fully understand the 
                                                          
8 http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx 
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knowledge, which is not a job that can be implemented according to predetermined rules. 
Therefore, managers must be capable of implementing intellectual activities. 
 Furthermore, managers must be able to correctly and completely report the knowledge 
to the CPB. Knowledge of something does not necessarily guarantee that it can be correctly 
reported to others. Reporting knowledge requires intelligence to adequately communicate to 
others. Managers therefore must be able to use their intelligence not only to understand the 
knowledge but also to communicate it to the CPB. 
 In addition to Condition 1, the following condition also needs to be satisfied for the 
perfect transmission of the knowledge to the CPB.  
 
Condition 2: Managers must be given sufficient incentive to completely and correctly report 
the knowledge to the CPB. 
 
Like workers, managers will not correctly report the knowledge to the CPB without incentives. 
Rewards and/or punishments need to be given to managers according to their performances on 
the transmission of the knowledge. Giving rewards and/or punishments necessitates that the 
CPB obtains knowledge on the performance of managers.  
 Even if Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied and the knowledge is correctly reported, the 
knowledge is useless if it is not utilized by the CPB. Therefore, the following third condition 
must also be satisfied.  
 
Condition 3: The CPB must process the sum of the knowledge reported from all managers.  
 
4.4  Failure of SPEs 
An SPE cannot match a DME in terms of productivity unless the above three conditions are 
satisfied. The three conditions are linked to each other and thus each of them is satisfied only 
when all of them are simultaneously satisfied because rewards and/or punishments will not 
otherwise be properly given. That, however, is not an easy task, especially in the case of 
Condition 3. Unlike Conditions 1 and 2, Condition 3 cannot be satisfied with “minor” 
modifications of the SPE scheme.  
 The CPB faces a serious problem in utilizing the reported knowledge because the 
volume of the knowledge it must process will far exceed its capacity to process the knowledge 
for two main reasons. First, the knowledge consists of not only simple symbols and data but 
also of descriptive explanations that include ambiguous impressions, perceptions, and intuitions, 
and a computer system intrinsically cannot handle this vast amount of knowledge. Second, a 
relatively small number of personnel in the CPB will need to handle reports from millions of 
managers, each of which contains the reports of many workers. That is, the CPB must handle 
the results of the intellectual activities of tens of millions or more workers who deal with 
billions or more unexpected problems and generate billions or more corresponding innovations 
every day. In essence the CPB needs to duplicate the sum of the intellectual activities that tens 
of millions of managers and workers implement. Each worker in the CPB would have the 
impossible task of correctly making decisions on wage settings and other aspects of personnel 
management by completely utilizing the reported knowledge on each of the tens of millions or 
more workers and managers. 
 Clearly, the CPB cannot sufficiently process all of the knowledge and utilize it to offer 
proper incentives for all managers and workers because there is an upper boundary on the 
amount of the knowledge a human being can deal with in a given period and on the number of 
workers at the CPB. Because computers intrinsically cannot deal with such knowledge, the 
upper boundary cannot be raised, even if the performance of computers improves substantially. 
The CPB, therefore, can utilize only a small portion of the knowledge and Condition 3 will not 
be met. As a result, it is practically impossible to construct an SPE that satisfies all three 
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conditions. 
 Because only a small portion of the knowledge can be utilized by the CPB, wages are 
determined without this knowledge. As a result, rewards and/or punishments with regard to 
generating innovations will be uncertain for workers, and workers will not expect to be 
rewarded or punished for their efforts to innovate. That is, μ is far lower than unity (μ ≈ 0) and 
the incentive for workers to generate innovations (i.e., innovate to fix unexpected problems) is 
almost zero. The overall productivity Ω then becomes very low (Ω[0]). Hence, by the AEPF, 
production in this modified SPE remains at a very low level.  
 
5  SCIENTIFIC INNOVATIONS IN SPEs 
 
Section 4 shows that workers will generate few innovations in SPEs as compared with DMEs, 
but is the same true for scientific and technical innovations (i.e., technology A in AEPF)? The 
USSR led the world in space and military technologies in the 1950s and 1960s, which suggests 
that an SPE may have some advantages in regard to scientific innovations. On the other hand, 
innovations in technologies for market-oriented goods and services in the USSR were 
unquestionably far behind those in DMEs at the same time. 
 As is the case with workers’ innovations, Lange’s model does not describe scientific 
innovations in an SPE because it is a static model, not a dynamic, let alone an endogenous 
growth, model. In static models, technology is assumed to be exogenously given, and thus with 
Lange’s model, nothing certain can be said about the generation of scientific innovations in 
SPEs. An endogenous growth model is required to examine the technology generation 
mechanism in SPEs.  
 
5.1  The model 
Here, I use the endogenous growth model by Harashima (2010) to analyze scientific innovations 
in an SPE because this model has the notable property that it is free from the problems of scale 
effects and the influence of population growth (e.g., see Jones, 1995a,b; Aghion and Howitt, 
1998; Peretto and Smulders, 2002).  
 
5.1.1  The basic structure 
Outputs Yt are the sum of consumption Ct, the increase in capital input tK , and the increase in 
technology tA  such that 
 
 tttt AνKCY    . 
 
Thus, 
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t
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L
n

 , Lt is labor input and  0ν  is a constant. A unit 
of Kt and 1ν  of a unit of At are equivalent; that is, they are produced using the same quantities 
of inputs (capital, labor, and technology). This means that technologies are produced with 
capital, labor, and technology in the same way as consumer goods and services and capital. 
Unlike most idea-based growth models, no special mechanism is required for the production of 
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technology because endogenous balanced growth (i.e., constant tt Ak
1 ) is not materialized by 
any special property of the production function of technology but by uncompensated knowledge 
spillovers and arbitrage between investments in capital and technology. 
 Because balanced growth paths are the focal point of this paper, Harrod-neutral 
technical progress is assumed. Hence, the production function is  αttαtt LAKY  1 ; thus, 
 
 αt
α
tt kAy
 1  . 
 
Population has an upper boundary and nt = 0 after some future period; thus, 0lim  tt n  and 
LLtt lim , where L  is a positive constant. 
 
5.1.2  Substitution between investments in capital and technology 
For any period,  
 
 tt MLm
1  ,                             (26) 
 
where Mt is the number of firms (which are assumed to be identical) and m (> 0) is a constant. 
Equation (26) presents a natural assumption that the population and number of firms are 
positively correlated. In addition, for any period,  
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thus,  
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is always kept, where  1  and  10  ρρ  are constants. The parameter ρ describes the 
effect of uncompensated knowledge spillovers, and the parameter ϖ indicates the effect of 
patent protection. With patents, incomes are distributed not only to capital and labor but also to 
technology. For simplicity, the patent period is assumed to be indefinite, and no capital 
depreciation is assumed.  
 Equations (27) and (28) indicate that returns on investing in capital and technology for 
the investing firm are kept equal. The driving force behind the equations is that firms exploit all 
opportunities and select the most profitable investments at all times. Through arbitrage, this 
behavior leads to equal returns on investments in capital and technology. With substitution 
between investments in capital and technology, the model exhibits endogenous balanced growth. 
Because   αtαtαtαtρ
ρ
t
t
t
t
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  by equations 
(26) and (27) which lucidly indicates that tt Ak
1  = constant, and the model can therefore show 
balanced endogenous growth. 
 Equations (27) and (28) also indicate that the investing firm cannot obtain all the 
returns on its investment in technology. That is, although investment in technology increases Yt, 
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the investing firm’s returns are only a fraction of the increase of Yt, such that  ttρt νA
Y
M 

1
 , 
because knowledge spills over to other firms without compensation and other firms possess 
complementary technologies. Both MAR externalities (Marshall, 1890; Arrow, 1962; Romer, 
1986) and Jacobs externalities (Jacobs, 1969) predict that uncompensated knowledge spillovers 
will increase as the number of firms increases, and scale effects have not actually been observed 
(Jones, 1995a), which implies that scale effects are almost canceled out by the effects of MAR 
and Jacobs externalities. Thus, the value of ρ is quite likely to be very small. From the point of 
view of a firm’s behavior, a very small ρ appears to be quite natural. Because firms intrinsically 
seek profit opportunities, newly established firms work as hard as existing firms to profit from 
knowledge spillovers. Competition over technologies will increase as the number of firms 
increases. Through more fierce competition, uncompensated knowledge spillovers will also 
increase, eventually to the point that they increase at the same rate as the increase in the number 
of firms. The investing firm’s fraction will thereby also be reduced at the same rate as the 
increase of the number of firms, which means that ρ will naturally decrease to zero as a result of 
firms’ profit-seeking behavior.  
 Complementary technologies also reduce the fraction of 
t
t
A
Y

  that the investing firm 
can obtain. If a new technology is effective only if it is combined with other technologies, the 
returns on investment in the new technology will belong not only to the investing firm but also 
to the firms that possess the other technologies. Because of both complementary technologies 
and uncompensated knowledge spillovers, the fraction of 
t
t
A
Y

  that an investing firm can 
obtain on average will be very small; that is, ϖ will be far smaller than Mt except when Mt is 
very small. 
 
5.1.3  The optimization 
As a whole, the optimization problem of the representative household is to maximize the 
expected utility 
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where u(•) is a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function and E is the expectation 
operator. 
 The optimal consumption growth rate is 
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where 
u'
u"cε t  is the degree of relative risk aversion, which is constant. Transversality 
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condition is satisfied if 0lim  
t
t
t k
c .  
 
5.2  Investments in technology in SPEs 
In a DME, the income increase obtained by an investment in technology is distributed to the 
investing firm, although a part of the income increase leaks to other firms without compensation. 
The income increase provides incentives for entrepreneurs to invest in technology. Through 
competition and arbitrage in markets, investments in technology increase up to the point 
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for ρ = 0. 
 If a CPB can make the same decisions on investments in technology for all of the 
dispersed production sites as those made by entrepreneurs in a DME, an SPE will be able to 
grow at the same rate as a DME. However, the same problem that arises for workers’ 
innovations also arises for scientific innovations. Decisions about investing in technology 
require substantial intellectual activities; if anything, they represent one of the most difficult 
economic decisions and require careful consideration from various aspects because investments 
in technology are very risky and many of them will fail.  
 Broadly speaking, there are two types of risks in investments in technology: scientific 
risks and economic risks. Scientific risk is the risk that scientific innovations are not actually 
generated as intended. Economic risk is the risk that new products that are produced using the 
scientific innovations do not meet market demands. The scientific risk may be centrally 
managed by a CPB, but the economic risk will not be easily handled by a CPB. Taking an 
economic risk requires knowledge of the expected demand of the newly developed goods or 
services. Before deciding to invest in the new technology, the demand for the new goods or 
services in the particular time and place has to be forecasted by analyzing, evaluating, and 
guessing various factors utilizing the all related information, including knowledge of specific 
categories of goods and services in the particular time and place. Because the technology is new, 
information on the demand needs to be newly analyzed and evaluated using human intelligence. 
Without these intellectual activities, therefore, the degree of risk cannot be properly evaluated, 
and appropriate decisions on investment in technology are impossible. The necessity of using 
human intelligence indicates that the investment decisions in market-oriented technologies 
cannot be replaced by a simple rule. Hence, the CPB must obtain and adequately process the 
knowledge on the specific demands for all new goods and services. Clearly, similar to the case 
of workers’ innovations, it is very difficult for the CPB to obtain all the knowledge that exists in 
all locations unless all managers correctly report the knowledge to the CPB.    
 
5.3  Scientific innovations in SPEs 
Section 5.2 indicates that the three conditions shown in Section 4 for workers’ innovations in an 
SPE must also be satisfied for the CPB to sufficiently obtain and process the knowledge on the 
specific demands of all new goods and services. The amount of knowledge necessary for 
making decisions on investments in technology may be less than that for offering proper 
incentive for workers’ innovations, but it will still be very difficult for the CPB to sufficiently 
process all of the knowledge obtained because analyzing and evaluating scientific and economic 
risks concerning innovations are intellectual activities. Therefore, the humans that conduct these 
activities intrinsically cannot be simply replaced with computers, and the CPB must process the 
results of millions or more managers’ intellectual activities. In addition, technology investment 
decisions require risk taking. If the CPB lacks the mindset of risk-taking entrepreneurs, many 
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relatively riskier but more productive investments in technology will be rejected. 
 If the CPB cannot correctly obtain and appropriately process the knowledge, far less 
relevant investments in technology will be made even though the return on investment in 
technology exceeds that in capital in actuality such that  
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Inequality (30) indicates that, in an SPE, equation (29) can be replaced with  
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where κ is a constant and 10  κ , and thereby the consumption growth rate on the balanced 
growth path is 
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Clearly, an SPE grows at the lower rate than a DME.  
 That said, with regard to investments in technologies that are not market oriented (e.g., 
space or military technology), knowledge of demand is not needed because the primary aim of 
such investments is not to maximize economic outcomes. Even in a DME such investments are 
usually initiated by governments, not markets. Therefore, innovations in these fields may be 
similar in the two types of economies.  
 
6  DISCUSSION 
 
6.1  Are workers robot-like or intellectual human beings? 
An essential difference between Lange’s and Hayek’s views lies in whether workers and 
managers are viewed as robot-like beings or intelligent beings with the capacity to innovate. In 
Lange’s view, only the CPB needs to have intelligence. Workers and managers only implement 
simple non-intellectual tasks as ordered by the CPB because the CPB is considered to be a 
perfect all-knowing institution. Thereby, workers and managers require no intelligence or 
innovation. In fact, managers and workers should not generate innovations because the CPB’s 
perfectly planned equilibrium would be destroyed by such actions. On the other hand, in 
Hayek’s view, the CPB, workers, and managers are equally imperfect and know only a fraction 
of the universe.  
 Lange’s view (or equivalently Walras’ view) abstracts an important element of the 
DME and provides a very useful framework for analyzing the phenomenon of equilibrium. As 
long as the focus is only on the phenomenon of equilibrium, Lange’s view is perfect. However, 
equilibrium is not the only area of interest in terms of economic activity. Lange lost the socialist 
calculation debate because his model did not account for a very important element of 
economy—workers and managers are all imperfect human beings who possess intelligence and 
generate a large number of innovations on a daily basis in dispersed production sites.  
 
6.2  Partially decentralized SPEs 
6.2.1  Partial decentralization 
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This paper concludes that a pure SPE is far less productive than a DME. However, if an SPE is 
partially decentralized, it may function almost as productively as a DME while maintaining the 
essential characteristics of an SPE. The first decentralization step is to delegate the power to 
determine wages and other aspects of personnel management to managers in the dispersed 
production sites. With this delegation, managers no longer need to report knowledge to the CPB, 
and thereby, conditions 2 and 3 no longer must be satisfied. The extra income gained by 
workers’ innovations can be distributed by managers, and if the managers properly distribute the 
extra income, the incentive for workers to generate innovation will be sufficiently raised. 
 However, a problem arises with this modification. Managers must also have the 
incentive to properly distribute the extra income. One solution is that higher ranking managers 
evaluate the performances of lower ranking managers and determine their wages and other 
personnel management based on their performances. Eventually, most of wage settings and 
other aspects of personnel management need to be decentralized and the CPB, as the top of the 
hierarchy, only manages the next highest ranking personnel. Nevertheless, if capital incomes are 
still owned socially and the highest levels of economic decision making are made by the CPB, 
this partially decentralized economy may still be regarded as a type of SPE. 
 
6.2.2  China’s socialist market economy 
Historically, pure SPEs have been rare. Mao’s China, Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, and 
North Korea are examples of almost pure SPEs. The USSR and other Soviet-bloc countries 
were partially decentralized, as was communist Yugoslavia. The current most substantially 
decentralized SPE is China.  
Since the 1980s, China has gradually but substantially decentralized its economy. 
Lower level decision making has been mostly decentralized. However, most large companies 
are still owned by the state, provinces, or state-owned parent enterprises, so most capital is still 
socially owned. In addition, top-ranking managers in large companies are designated by the 
state and the highest levels of economic decision making are still made by the Communist Party. 
Therefore, although China’s economy is largely decentralized, it can be regarded still as a type 
of SPE. China calls its economic system a “socialist market economy.” Because decision 
making is largely decentralized, more workers’ innovations should be generated than were 
generated in its earlier purer SPE. In fact, recent high growth rates in China may be partially 
driven by the increased number of workers’ innovations. The number of scientific innovations 
may also have increased. Furthermore, because trade between China and other DMEs has 
substantially increased, China can now also import many technologies.  
 Nevertheless, because the highest levels of decision making are not decentralized, 
incentives to innovate may still be biased to some extent. Overall efficiency depends on the 
abilities and principles of the top-ranking officials in the Communist Party. If people in the top 
of the hierarchy are competent and are not corrupt, such a socialist market economy could work 
well in theory; but if they are incompetent or corrupt, the economy may be severely distorted. 
Particularly, corruption can be a significant issue in undemocratic countries such as China. As a 
result of corruption, non-negligible inefficiencies will remain in the system, and China’s 
socialist market economy therefore may stay far less productive than other DMEs even though it 
is substantially decentralized.  
 China’s economy has enjoyed high growth rates since the 1980s, but high growth does 
not necessarily indicate superiority of China’s socialist market economy over other DMEs. 
Three special factors are worth noting in the current case of China. First, the high growth 
reflects the transition from the very unproductive Mao-era communist economy to a relatively 
more productive socialist market economy. Second, high growth rates are historically common 
during the early stages of capital accumulation in many economies, for example, in the USSR, 
Japan, and some other Asian countries. Third, opening up international trade will also initially 
accelerate the growth rate. Clearly, these factors are not limited to China’s socialist market 
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economy and do not indicate superiority. When China’s transitional period is complete, the 
period of high growth in China will also most likely end, even if its productivity still remains 
lower than that in other DMEs. It is noteworthy that the share of consumption in GDP has been 
remarkably lower and capital has accumulated more rapidly and probably more inefficiently in 
China than in most DMEs. These phenomena imply that the Chinese economy still possesses 
some of the characteristics of old SPEs (e.g., the USSR); that is, its growth is largely driven by 
compulsory savings and capital accumulation engineered implicitly by the state (e.g., various 
regulations in factor markets may be substantially distorting the economy).  
 The economy of the USSR stagnated after the 1960s even though its rate of 
productivity was still far lower than that in other DMEs. My arguments indicate that an 
important reason for the stagnation and low productivity was that its economy was not 
sufficiently decentralized. Because of centralization, fewer workers’ and scientific innovations 
were generated. China’s current economy is far more decentralized than that of the USSR in the 
1970s. Therefore, even after China’s period of high growth ends, it may not immediately 
stagnate. In addition, unlike the USSR, China is more open to the world economy and is a 
member of the World Trade Organization. Hence, China can benefit from global technological 
progress and may continue to grow steadily at the same rate as the global technology growth 
rate. 
 
7  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Because most socialist economies collapsed or changed dramatically to become considerably 
decentralized in the late twentieth century, the debate on the superiority between SPEs and 
DMEs has almost disappeared. However, a consensus has not necessarily been reached over the 
theoretical and practical reasons why SPEs failed. Currently, Hayek is considered to be the 
winner of the socialist calculation debate, but his arguments are prone to be misunderstood 
because his view goes beyond the Walrasian framework and his papers are descriptive and do 
not use mathematical models. This paper attempts to make Hayek’s arguments more 
straightforward by using them as a basis to construct a model of total factor productivity. 
 The model is particularly based on Hayek’s view on knowledge and focuses on 
innovations generated by ordinary workers. The model shows that productivity in an economy 
depends substantially on ordinary workers’ innovations generated to fix unexpected problems 
through the use of their human intelligence. In a DME, workers’ innovations (intelligence) are 
intrinsically utilized fully because they benefit both workers and entrepreneurs who pursue fully 
exploiting the opportunities that workers’ innovations (intelligence) provide. On the other hand, 
they are not utilized in SPEs unless the knowledge of unexpected problems and workers’ 
innovations (intelligence) is both adequately obtained and processed by the CPB, which was 
shown to be an impossible task. Hence, the model indicates that SPEs are intrinsically far less 
productive than DMEs. DMEs are similarly more productive with market-oriented scientific 
innovations, although not necessarily more productive with nonmarket goods and services (e.g., 
military technology). 
 An essential difference between Lange’s and Hayek’s views lies in whether workers 
and managers are viewed as robot-like beings or intelligent beings with the capacity to innovate. 
Lange lost the socialist calculation debate because his model did not account for a very 
important element of economy—workers and managers are all imperfect human beings who 
possess intelligence and generate a large number of innovations on a daily basis in dispersed 
production sites.  
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Figure 1   The distribution of innovation 
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